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RESIDENTIAL RENEWABLE ENERGY: BY WHOM? 
Joel B. Eisen· 
President Obama's 2011 State of the Union speech termed development of 
clean energy sources our "Sputnik Moment," and called for 80 percent of the 
nation's electricity to be generated from renewables, clean coal, and nuclear power 
by 2035. 1 The Sputnik metaphor is less than ideal, because it confuses the issue by 
introducing a security dimension with no direct parallel to the present situation.2 
However, the president's message is clear: we need research, development and 
deployment of a new generation of energy technologies. As the president put it, 
"We're telling America's scientists and engineers that if they assemble teams of 
the best minds in their fields, and focus on the hardest problems in clean energy, 
we'll fund the Apollo projects of our time."3 
The president's focus on the technology of renewable energy, however, is an 
indicator that a deceptively difficult question remains less well addressed: how can 
we overcome the built-in barriers of the current electricity infrastructure and create 
the distribution system that will bring renewable energy to American homes? The 
technology already exists to put solar photovoltaic (PV) panels on millions of 
homes,4 but we have paid inadequate attention to getting them there. This current 
lack of focus on distribution will limit residential solar deployment indefinitely, 
unless it is addressed soon. 
While a number of solutions to this problem have been proposed or are in 
various stages of implementation, this Article finds that given the pressing need to 
address climate change, more rapid action is needed. In addition to pursuing other 
options for generating electricity using renewables (including onshore and offshore 
• © 2011 Joel B. Eisen. Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. 
The author acknowledges and thanks fellow participants Jim Rossi, Richard Pierce, Joseph 
Tomain, Amy Wildermuth, and symposium leader Lincoln Davies and the University of 
Utah's S.J. Quinney College of Law for an outstanding conference on "The Future of 
Energy Law" in January 2011 that led to invaluable feedback on this topic, and Clayton 
Laforge, Madelaine Kramer, Garland Carr, and Aminah Qureshi for research assistance. 
1 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of Union Address (Jan. 
25,2011). 
2 See Joel B. Eisen, The New Energy Geopolitics?: China, Renewable Energy, and the 
"Greentech Race," 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 104-05 (2011). 
3 President Barack Obama, supra note 1. . 
4 Joel B. Eisen, Can Urban Solar Become a "Disruptive" Technology: The Case for 
Solar Utilities, 24 NOTRE DAME. J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 53, 53-56 (2010) (hereinafter 
Eisen, Solar Utilities] (citing ARJUN MAKHIJANI, CARBON-FREE AND NUCLEAR-FREE: A 
ROADMAP FOR U.S. ENERGY POLICY 37-40 (2007)). See also ACCENTURE, CARBON 
CAPITAL: FINANCING THE LOW CARBON ECONOMY 13 (2011) (noting that, "Solar PV cost 
per MW-capacity has decreased by more than 30 per cent between 2000 and 2010"), 
available at https://microsite.accenture.com/sustainability/research _and_ insights/ 
Documents/ Accenture_ Barclays_ Carbon_ Capital.pdf. 
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wind power, and utility-scale solar power stations), and ramping up energy 
efficiency and conservation efforts, we must achieve routinization5 in residential 
solar. The process of adding PV panels to American houses must become as 
routine as a car purchase. Residential solar can only become a widespread 
consumer product when the purchase and installation process transforms frorh a 
model that resembles custom construction (with individual homeowners effectively 
serving as general contractors) to one that is virtually transparent to the consumer. 
Overcoming the entrenched position of electric utilities, and their extensive system 
of subsidies, requires government support of firms that will take on the 
responsibility of offering residential homeowners solar panel systems. I have 
previously termed such firms "solar utilities"6 and explain in this Article why they 
(or some other new form of market entrant such as smart grid companies) must 
supplant the nascent industry of residential solar companies. 
I. THE PROBLEM: THE HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO OF "CARS AND 'PMVS"' 
Illustrating the challenges involved in scaling up residential solar is not 
difficult. Imagine a different context: household transportation. Suppose you are 
the head of a four-person suburban household with two cars. You decided to 
purchase a car to replace one of two you currently own, which has high mileage 
and is starting to incur steep repair costs. Being receptive to environmentally 
friendly vehicles if they don't cost "too much," you settled on a hybrid gas-electric 
family sedan after some research on the Internet, and established that its price 
should be approximately $30,000.7 You clicked on a few links and determined that 
until the end of 2010 there was a federal tax credit available for purchase of hybrid 
vehicles, 8 which brought the cost down roughly to parity with conventional 
gasoline-powered vehicles (even without the tax break the differential was no 
longer as steep as in the past).9 Then, you identified four dealers m your 
5 See B.C. FARHAR & T.C. COBURN, A NEW MARKET PARADIGM FOR ZERO-ENERGY 
HOMES: THE COMPARATIVE SAN DIEGO CASE STUDY, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. 17 
(2006) (noting with respect to the solar PV panel systems offered in new homes in a 
subdivision studied in San Diego that, "[t]he significance of such an offering by a large-
production builder is that it potentially makes the offer of these types of homes routine 
rather than unique specialty commodities offered only by custom builders"). 
6 See generally Eisen, Solar Utilities, supra note 4. 
7 Ford Fusion Hybrid: What the Auto Press Says, U.S. NEWS RANKINGS & REVIEWS: 
BEST CARS, http://usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/cars-trucks/F ord _Fusion-Hybrid/ (last 
updated Jan. 3, 2011) (average mid-sized hybrid costs $28,670). 
8 Qualified Hybrid Vehicles, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/ 
article/O,,id=203122,00.html (last updated Dec. 16, 2010). 
9 Jerry Edgerton, Hybrids Costing The Same As Gas Cars (Or Close), CBS 
MONEYWATCH.COM (July 27, 2010), http://moneywatch.bnet.com/saving-money/blog/cars-
money/hybrid-cars-that-dont-cost-more/l l l l/; F.T.C., FACTS FOR CONSUMERS: BUYING A 
NEW CAR (2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/autos/autl 1.pdf 
(average price of a new car sold in the United States is $28,400). 
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metropolitan area that sold this brand of vehicle, contacted them for test drives, 
and entered into negotiatio.ns to purchase a car in the next thirty days from vehicles 
in stock. 
Now, let's change this transaction. Instead of car dealers, suppose you must 
buy automobiles from custom coach builders who assemble low volumes of cars to 
· buyers' individual specifications and needs. The sticker price of any car is a means 
of discussion between you and the custom manufacturer. Until he knows how 
many seats you want in the car, what engine and transmission you want, and what 
steering column fits your needs (because you need some understanding of these 
automotive subsystems to buy a car), he cannot and will not quote you a price. You 
have heard from friends, however, that cars cost tens of thousands of dollars. You 
find car builders through word of mouth, and there is no reliable means of 
establishing whether any of them will be around in the years to come when your 
car needs maintenance, and no reliable network of aftermarket repair shops. 
Let's make another assumption that the car is not the only way to get around 
suburbia. The small-batch nature of custom makers limits car ownership to perhaps 
only one out of one hundred of your suburban neighbors, but households already 
have comparable forms of transportation that we'll call personal mobility vehicles, 
or "PMVs." PMVs, unlike cars, are sold widely at dealers throughout the nation, 
and there is an extensive support infrastructure (repair shops, parts stores, and so 
forth) that supports them. Information about where to buy new PMVs and re-sell 
used ones is easy to come by, with fluid markets everywhere. 
In this scenario, "cars" are the emerging technology, not the one that has 
existed for decades. This, of course, flips our normal understanding of the 
transportation landscape. The purpose of this inversion is simple: to highlight the 
entrenched advantages that an incumbent technology-which one might call 
"OldTech"-has over one that would displace it-"~ewTech"-by using a most 
unusual and unlikely model to stimulate creative thinking about those advantages. 
Suspend disbelief and contemplate a world in which the PMV industry had all the 
advantages the car industry does now. As there is no "PMV" industry, of course, 
when we speak of cars as NewTech, OldTech's advantages will be precisely those 
of the American auto industry. 
Then, imagine extending that analogy to a completely different field, 
residential solar, where an entrenched industry (electric utilities) will be OldTech 
with many, if not all, of the same advantages. So many, in fact, that this Article 
will refer metaphorically to solar panels, the NewTech of electric power 
generation, as "cars" attempting to break the stranglehold of a dominant 
competitor, even though in the real world, cars are OldTech. Electric utilities are 
OldTech and solar panels are NewTech, because electric utilities have comparable 
regulatory and economic advantages to those of the real world American 
automobile industry. When solar panels are "cars," then, electric utilities will be 
PMV sellers. 
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A. The Entrenched Advantages of "P MVs" 
With that scenario in mind, consider now why anyone would switch from a 
PMV to a "car." The answer, of course, is that few, if any, would do so. Only those 
most determined to have a car would put up with a custom builder's lengthy 
purchase process or gamble tens of thousands of dollars on an untested car 
company when they could trot down the street and snap up a PMV. Perhaps those 
most concerned with drawbacks to owning PMV s (poor environmental 
·performance, perhaps) would buy cars. 
Can PMV owners be given financial incentives to switch? At some point, a 
compelling incentive might prompt many to do so. Gift wrap a vehicle and put it in 
my driveway and I will drive it. Consider some other innovative ideas: a tax credit 
of 30 percent on new car purchases, a break on gasoline prices for those 
purchasing cars, or a financial arrangement that makes the car free up front in 
return for increasing your taxes to pay for it over the long term. 
Would many consumers take advantage of these? Probably not. Buying a car 
is an arduous, time-consuming endeavor, and there are serious transaction costs 
associated with it that do not exist in the PMV distribution channel. There is no 
"nudge" 10 for this purchase. There is no easy way to check off a box on the tax 
return, take the recycling bin offered at the curb, or opt into an individual 
retirement account with automatic payroll deductions. Or, for that matter, to do 
what one can in the real world: show up at a dealership and leave with an 
automobile that day. 
Until it is as easy to buy a car as it is a PMV, economic incentives to do so 
will be limited in their effectiveness. Consider how PMV companies retain their 
dominant market position with enormous economic advantages over car 
companies. PMVs fulfill a basic human need (transportation) in such a systematic 
way that we take their distribution infrastructure for granted. Firms selling PMVs 
enjoy production economies of scale, a ubiquitous market presence and the 
enormous reservoir of goodwill derived from the system set up to generate and 
disseminate information about the PMV market. Billions of dollars are spent 
promoting PMVs, 11 but no Don Drapers12 are vying for the car advertising account. 
10 Stefanie Simon, The Secret to Turning Consumers Green, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 
20 I 0, at RI. The term "nudge" and the examples used in the text, of course, come from the 
important book on behavioral economics, RICHARD R. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEAL TH, WEAL TH, AND HAPPINESS (2009). 
11 Claes Bell, Carmakers Spend Big to Influence Your Next Buy, BANKRATE.COM 
(June 9, 20 I 0), http://www.bankrate.com/financing/ cars/carmakers-spend-big-to-influence-
your-next-buy/#ixzz l Ccfjpgtt (noting that, "On Advertising Age's list of the top 100 ad 
spenders, nine are automakers. Together, they spent a total of more than $11 billion on 
advertising in one year with the goal of changing the way you think about their products."). 
12 Don Draper is the 1960s advertising executive on MAD MEN (AMC). 
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PMV s are so ingrained in our society that popular films, television programs, and 
academic literature describe our nation as a "PMV culture."13 
That is hardly PMVs' only economic advantage. The PMV infrastructure has 
huge subsidies, some overt but some hidden from public view. State legislatures 
and Congress view the PMV industry as essential to local economies, and prop it 
up with research and development funding 14 and numerous tax credits and 
deductions. When the American PMV manufacturing industry showed signs of 
economic stress during a recession, the government stepped in with billions of 
dollars in support. 15 States do not force the PMV industry to fully internalize 
environmental costs into their products (with, say, stringent emissions standards), 
which allows them to sell vehicles below their full social cost. 
This system of economic subsidization is so extensive, and yet so 
unaccounted for in the price of a PMV, that it creates a barrier to car purchases. 
The tax credits and financial incentives offered to consumers to buy cars pale in 
size compared to PMV subsidies. In an average year, they might amount to 1 
percent of the total direct and indirect economic benefits given to the PMV 
industry. Unlike enduring PMV incentives, however, car subsidies have high 
public visibility, as they are targeted to individual consumers and have to be 
renewed almost every year by Congress. 16 Incredibly enough, this creates ample 
opportunities for politicians to claim that car incentives are giveaways that "hurt" 
the PMV industry, which is tortured logic, given the deep system of PMV 
economic subsidization. 
Beyond PMV companies' pervasive economic advantages are the inherent 
advantages of an existing legal system that regulates at many points along the 
PMV production and distribution timeline. No one should be surprised that this 
system provides no incentives to "car" companies, because it has been developed 
and refined for decades without them in mind. This system is an ill fit for "cars," 
and much time would be consumed on fundamental disputes over definitional 
13 See David E. Shi, Well, America: Is the Car Culture Working?, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
July 9, 2000, available at http://www.commondreams.org/views/070900- l 04.htm (noting 
that, "The automobile retains its firm hold over our psyche. because it continues to 
represent a metaphor for what Americans have always prized: the seductive ideal of private 
freedom, personal mobility, and empowered spontaneity."). 
14 See, e.g., DELOITTE DEVELOPMENT LLC, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TAX 
INCENTIVES FOR THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY (2010), available at http://www.deloitte.com 
/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/us _tax _rd_ automotive_ 0831 
10_16092010.pdf. 
15 Automobile Industry Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/ 
timestopics/subjects/c/credit_ crisis/auto _industry/index.html (last updated Jan. 13, 2011 ). 
16 For a view of this in the renewable energy context, see, e.g., Eiden: Congress 
Should Extend Treasury Cash Grants for Renewable Projects, CLIMATE PROGRESS (Nov. 
l 0, 20 l 0), http://climateprogress.org/2010/1111 O/biden-congress-should-extend-treasury-
cash-grants-for-renewable-projects/. 
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issues. Indeed, a threshold question might be whether "cars" are subject to this 
system, 17 or whether a new system should be created for them. 
A car company would also discover that there is little consistency among state 
regulatory systems. PMV companies have decades of experience in adjusting their 
business models to the different legal environments that they face in various states, 
with help from sympathetic state officials who want to make sure that PMV 
companies will not pick up and move to other states. A PMV company would see 
this as one of many ways in which the regulatory system has been captured over 
time by the regulated community of PMV manufacturers. 
No car firm entering into the market could readily overcome these headwinds. 
In the real world's transportation sector, we know how tough it is to overcome 
barriers to market entry posed by incumbent companies' advantages. John 
DeLorean, 18 Preston Tucker, 19 and a host of others have tried and failed to break 
auto companies' grip on the market with new automobiles (never mind trying it 
with new products), and their failures speak to the daunting challenges involved. 
B. "Solar Panels" Are "Cars" 
The barriers to more widespread distribution of residential solar are the 
expense of the panels, the transaction costs associated with their installation, 20 and 
the difficulties of connecting to the existing electric utility grid.21 And, as 
suggested above, if "solar panels" are NewTech-like "cars," the. comparable 
OldTech "PMV" industry is the American electric utility industry. Our system of 
energy law promotes entrenched technologies, not emerging ones.22 Regulated 
natural monopoly rates guarantee utilities' profitability. In my state of Virginia, an 
incumbent utility is even being paid extra to build a new coal-fired plant, 
17 The analogy here is to whether power purchase agreements by renewable energy 
companies subject them to regulation under state law as "utilities." Eisen, Solar Utilities, 
supra note 4, at 93 n.209. . 
18 See HILLEL LEVIN, GRAND DELUSIONS: THE COSMIC CAREER OF JOHN DELOREAN 
(1983). 
19 See PHILIP S. EGAN, DESIGN AND DESTINY: THE MAKING "OF THE TUCKER 
AUTOMOBILE (1989); TUCKER: THE MAN AND HIS DREAM (Lucasfilm 1988). 
20 The series of articles by Scientific American writer George Musser is a vivid 
illustration of the difficulties involved in a residential solar installation. George Musser, 
Solar Power Purchase Agreements, aka Let Someone Else Deal with the Paperwork for 
You, SCI. AM. (Aug. 3, 2009, 8:00 AM), http://www.scientificamerican.com/blog/post.cfin 
?id=power-purchase-agreements-aka-let-s-2009-08-03. 
21 FARHARAND COBURN, supra note 5, at 52. 
22 See Lincoln L. Davies, Stegner Symposium Essay: Energy Policy Today and 
Tomorrow - Toward Sustainability?, 29 1. LAND, RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 71, 76-81 
(2009) (presenting data on low levels of spending on renewables, and noting that "our 
nation's lackluster commitment to renewables and energy conservation" fits within the 
"dominant energy policy paradigm" set forth in Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of 
Uniied States Energy Policy, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 355 (1990)). 
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greenhouse gas emissions be damned.23 Utilities' fossil fuel suppliers enjoy far 
more pervasive subsidies than renewable energy industries.24 
It makes as much sense to ask this system to ramp up residential solar as it 
would to ask PMV dealers to sell cars. Consider the renewable portfolio standard, 
which requires that a utility obtain a specific percentage of its electricity from 
renewable resources.25 In theory, utilities might satisfy an RPS with numerous 
small sources to serve as the equivalent of one or many power plants, with 
23 See Brian R. Greene & Katherine A. Hart, Public Utility Law, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 
295, at n.51, 54-64, 74 (2008) (citing provisions of the•Virginia electricity re-regulation 
law, including VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.l(A)(6) (Supp. 2008), and Virginia State 
Corporation Commission decisions that provide an "enhanced ROE" for a "coal-fueled 
generation facility that utilizes Virginia coal and is located in the coalfield region of the 
Commonwealth [Southwest Virginia]," and noting that, "Incenting utilities to build 
generation projects served as the primary purpose of the 2007 amendments to the Act."); 
David A. Fahrenthold, Dominion's Coal-Fired Electric Plant to Advance, WASH. POST, 
June 26, 2008, at BO I. 
24 A recent report from the Environmental Law Institute estimates total subsidies to 
fossil fuel industries at $72 billion between 2002-2008, far more than those available to the 
renewables industries (and six times the amount of subsidies if renewables used as fuel are 
not counted). ENVTL. L. INST., ESTIMATING U.S. GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES TO ENERGY 
SOURCES: 2002~2008 (2009), available at http://www.eli.org/Program _Areas/innovation_ 
govemance_energy.cfm; see also What If Solar Got the Same Subsidies as Coal?, 
CLEANTECHNICA.COM (Oct. 21, 2010), http://cleantechnica.com/2010/10/21/what-if-solar-
got-the-same-subsidies-as-coal/ (noting the same disparity); Daniel J. Weiss, Big Oil's Lust 
for Tax Loopholes, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.americanprogress 
.org/issues/2011/01/oil_lust.html (discussing the President's call in the State of the Union 
speech for eliminating billions of dollars in annual oil and gas industry subsidies); Tyson 
Slocum, Promoting Locally-Owned Renewable Electricity for Households: The Case for 
Feed-In Tariffs, presentation at William & Mary School of Law Symposium, Diversify 
Your Portfolio: Regulating Energy Sources with Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards, 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. (Jan. 29, 2010) (copy on file with author) (noting 
that "the oil industry [is] receiving $9 billion/year in tax breaks+ royalty relief'). 
25 See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 
42 CONN. L. REV. 1339 (2010) (discussing RPS programs); Joshua P. Fershee, Changing 
Resources, Changing Market: The Impact of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard on 
the U.S. Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L. J. 29 (2008). As of February 2011, twenty-nine 
states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have RPS mandates, and an additional 
seven have voluntary goals or other RPS-like programs. DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES 
FOR RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY, SUMMARY MAP: RPS POLICIES, http://dsireusa.org; 
Approximately 50 percent of total electricity load is now in states that have RPS programs. 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY., RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS FACT SHEET, 
http://www.epa.gov/chp/state-policy/renewable_fs.html (last updated Apr. 2009). See 
generally DAVID HURLBUT, NATL. RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., STATE CLEAN ENERGY 
PRACTICES: RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS (2008). For a description of one state's 
renewable portfolio standard, see CALIF. ENERGY COMM'N, CALIFORNIA'S RENEWABLE 
ENERGY PROGRAMS, http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/ (last modified Nov. 10, 2010) 
(California law requires utilities to obtain 20 percent of energy from reriewable sources). 
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individual consumers looking more like "supply" than "demand." Yet many 
utilities have been reluctant or unwilling to satisfy their RPS obligations in this 
fashion, preferring larger sources such as wind farms. 26 Utilities are like PMV 
companies, and no amount of persuasion or mandate (short of actually requiring 
them to sell NewTech solar panels) will prompt them to embrace distributed solar. 
They can build or buy power from large, centralized solar or wind farms-these 
are more like power plants-but getting into the business of small-scale power 
systems is not their forte. 27 
The current mix of subsidies and incentives for renewable energy systems 
attempts an end run on this problem, with a specific assumption: provide a tax 
credit or other incentive such as a feed-in tariff (FIT), and installations will 
skyrocket. That presumes that the existing system of subsidies that encourages the 
status quo can be overcome. Worse yet, it forces competition for subsidy dollars 
with the existing system. Every demand for an incentive for renewables meets with 
resistance. Political opposition to FITs, for example, centers on their subsidization 
of one set of electric utility ratepayers,28 as if other ratepayers did not benefit from 
fossil fuel subsidies. As a result of constant opposition, the long-term outlook for 
renewables subsidies is iffy.29 Even the most aggressive funding programs can 
26 An excellent case study of this is David G. Loomis & Adrienne Ohler, Are 
Renewable Portfolio Standards a Policy Cure-All? A Case Study of Illinois's Experience, 
35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 135, 150-55 (2010) (noting that Illinois utilities 
and those situated in other Midwestern states satisfied the states' RPS largely with power 
purchased from wind farms). 
27 In his thoughtful and comprehensive keynote speech at the conference for which 
this Article was developed, Edward Comer, the Vice President and General Counsel of the 
Edison Electric Institute (the trade association representing many of the nation's largest 
electric utilities), spoke about the prospects for meeting future demand for electricity in the 
United States. He mentioned the challenges of incorporating wind and solar into the 
electric grid, but did not call for widespread adoption of distributed generation. Edward H. 
Comer, The Future of Energy Law-Electricity, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 429, 429-31, 435 
(2011). 
28 Davies, supra note 25. 
29 ACCENTURE, supra note 4, at 49 (noting that around the world, "stability and long-
term public commitment ofLCT incentives (FIT, guaranteed loans, tax-credits) and carbon 
policies (carbon tax, and emissions reduction commitments), whilst critical, are yet to be 
achieved"). 
2011] RESIDENTIAL RENEW ABLE ENERGY 347 
suffer from a lack of stability,30 and tax policies come and go.31 This is especially 
problematic, as project financing requires long run predictability of subsidies. 32 
Opponents of solar and wind mandates and subsidies are unwilling to 
acknowledge that they represent a system that is much more heavily subsidized.33 
There is a predictable and enormous base of subsidies to fossil fuel industries, but 
it is difficult in the current political climate to demand that these subsidies be 
redirected. 34 Take your lance and tilt against that particular windmill all you like. It 
will never move. 
Advocating for tax credits and financial incentives for solar also presumes 
that the "car" distribution infrastructure either exists or could be developed. A 
homeowner receives a 30 percent tax credit for putting a qualifying solar system 
into place,35 but that credit is only claimed after she has installed and paid for the 
system.36 Once the average homeowner recognizes that a solar installation is a 
customized proposition requiring considerable labor and oversight on her part,37 
the tax credit begins to lose some of its luster. 
30 See, e.g., Richard Read, Oregon Trims Tax Credits for Residential Solar Panels, 
THE OREGONIAN, July 15, 2010, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index 
.ssf/2010/07 /oregon _trims_ tax_ credits_ for _r.html. 
31 Jan Ellen Spiegel, The Solar Tax Credit Roller Coaster: A Personal View, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/the-solar-tax-credit-
roller-coaster-a-personal-view/ (noting a rush to complete projects before the expiration of 
tax credits at the end of 2010). 
32 ACCENTURE, supra note 4, at 4 ("We need clear and consistent policy frameworks 
to help unlock the required flow of private capital"); PEW CH~TABLE TRUSTS, GLOBAL 
CLEAN POWER: A $2.3 TRILLION OPPORTUNITY (2010); SOPHIE JUSTICE, U.N. ENV'T. 
PROGRAMME, PRIVATE FINANCING OF RENEWABLE ENERGY: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 
13-14 (2009) (noting that, "Policy stability and 'grandfathering' will be a constant theme 
in policy discussions: will governments guarantee that policy conditions existing at the 
time of a particular investment are 'carried over' in the event of any subsequent policy 
change."). 
33 See, e.g., Steve Maley, Obama 's Clueless Energy Policy, REDSTATE (Jan. 26, 2011 
4:00 PM), http://www.redstate.com/vladimir/2011/01/26/obamas-clueless-energy-policy/. 
34 See,· e.g., James Barrett, What Obama Should Know about Ending Oil Subsidies, 
GRIST (Feb. 7, 2011 11 :39 AM), http://www.grist.org/article/201 l-02-07-what-obama-
should-know-about-ending-oil-subsidies. 
35 The tax credits available for placing renewable energy property into place are 
discussed in Eisen, Solar Utilities, supra note 4, at 77-78. 
36 See IRS, 1545-0074, FORM 5695 RESIDENTIAL ENERGY CREDITS,(2010), available 
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f5695.pdf. 
37 Musser, supra note 20. 
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II. TOWARD MORE WIDESPREAD SOLAR DISTRIBUTION: THE PROBLEM 
OF "DIFFUSION" OF SOLAR TECHNOLOGY 
Until now, I have assumed that economic subsidies and other barriers will 
prevent NewTech ("cars" or solar panels) from achieving critical mass in the 
marketplace. The literature on innovation, however, suggests a dynamic process of 
technological diffusion. There is a well-known "S-curve" along which new 
technology is adopted, with a lag between invention and mass commercialization.38 
The first points on the curve represent early adopters. Some people are more 
motivated than others to be the first to try a new technology,39 but most others wait 
to buy it until well after early adopters have done so.40 At that time, there can be a 
strong bandwagon effect that. catalyzes purchases by reluctant adopters,41 or, 
maybe not, if the technology has only a limited niche appeal. 42 This phenomenon 
38 BRONWYN H. HALL & BEETHIKA KHAN, ADOPTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY (2002), 
available at ftp://www.econ.berkeley.edu/pub/html/users/bhhall/oldpapers/Hal1Khan03% 
20NBER%20WP9730%20diff.pdf; see also FARHAR & COBURN, supra note 5, at 12 
(noting that, "adoption of an innovation usually follows a normal bell curve. If the 
cumulative number of adopters is plotted, the result is an S-shaped curve"); ACCENTURE, 
supra note 4, at 24-28 (modeling adoption of low carbon technologies using the S-curve 
method). 
39 FARHAR & COBURN, supra note 5, at 12. 
40 EVERETT ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (1995). One marketing strategist 
describes the S-curve as follows: 
Many marketeers are familiar with the work of Everett Rogers, 
encapsulated in his book Diffusion of Innovations (4th ed 1995). It was Rogers 
who identified the social system by which we absorb novelties into common 
practice. A tiny proportion of the population (3-4%) are innovators. The early 
adopters make up about 13% of the population, and these· tend to be the 
experimenters. They also get other people interested. The early majority, about a 
third of the population, are the ones who will start to buy if they see a lot of 
early adopters using it. You've got to get them on board, to hit the half way 
mark in any given population. 
The rest is downhill. Another third of the population are late majority. 
They like things that are commonplace. They won't adopt until the majority 
adopts. And finally the laggards - the conservative 14% of the population, who 
refuse to adopt any novelty until it's already old news. 
Patrick Lambe, Marketing Innovations, GREENCHAMELEON (2003), http://www.greencham 
eleon.com/thoughtpieces/niarketinn.pdf. 
41 ROGERS, supra note 40, at 263-67. 
42 F ARHAR & COBURN, supra note 5, at xvi (noting that, "Conventional wisdom on the 
markets for ZEHs, relying on a diffusion-of-innovations tradition, holds that ZEHs will 
appeal only to niche early-adopter markets."). 
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relates in part to "observability," or "the degree to which the results of an 
innovation are visible to others.'143 
This S-curve plots the number of people who adopt a new product over time, 
but the "product" itself often changes. Still, consumers may be willing to purchase 
a product, even when they know that constant improvements to a core technology44 
will make the next product generation technically superior. The first cell phones 
were the size of notebooks and cumbersome to use, but people bought them 
anyway. It is not necessary for the technology to be as good as it ever will be 
before consumers will buy it. 
Also, even as people are buying a new product, there can be a lag in popular 
perception of it. Critics often assail a new technology as inferior to existing 
products. Their focus is typically on metrics used to evaluate existing products, not 
the new one, and their analyses are presented as if the new product were required 
to do exactly what the existing one did. This should come as no surprise: if you are 
used to evaluating nails and hammers, your assessment of a power drill will focus 
on whether it does what nails and hammers do. 
In residential solar, this disparity between what the product can do and what 
critics claim it cannot do is readily apparent in objections that the cost of eledricity 
generated frnm solar panels is higher than that of electricity generated from 
conventional sources,45 or that the conversion efficiency of a solar panel is not as 
high as it could be. Also, consider objections to state RPSs based on potential 
increases in consumer electric rates.46 It does not matter to critics that rates may 
rise by minor amounts in the short term after an RPS is adopted,47 but will drop in 
43 Id. at 18-19. 
44 Technological improvements are typically incremental once a major innovation has 
been made. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative 
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 29 (1991) (noting that "almost all 
technical progress builds on a foundation provided by earlier innovators"). 
45 See, e.g., Jay Yarow, Solar Still Can't Compete On Efficiency Or Price, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Feb. 9, 2009 9:01 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/2009/2/solar~still-cant­
compete-on-efficiency-or-price. 
46 See, e.g., David Kruetzer et al., A Renewable Electricity Standard: What It Will 
Really Cost Americans, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (May 5, 2010), http://www. 
heritage.org/research/reports/2010/05/a-renewable-electricity-standard-what-it-will-really-
cost-americans; WILLIAM YEATMAN & MYRON EBELL, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., GONE 
WITH THE WIND: RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD THREATENS CONSUMERS AND THE 
INDUSTRIAL HEARTLAND (2007), available at http://cei.org/pdf/5982.pdf; For an objection 
in one specific state, see Dion Lefler, Renewable Energy Law Could Cost Consumers, 
WICHITA EAGLE, Nov. 9, 2010, available at http://www.kansas.com/2010/l l/ 
09/1580050/renewable-energy-law-could-cost.html. 
~ ' See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., IMPACTS OF A 15-
PERCENT RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD (June 2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ 
servicerpt/prps/rps.html [hereinafter IMPACTS OF A 15-PERCENT RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO 
STANDARD]; Constant I. Tra, Have Renewable Portfolio Standards Raised Electricity 
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later years as more renewable resources come on line.48 Presented without any 
context (for example, addressing the environmental externalities of fossil fuel 
generation that are as yet not fully accounted for in the price of electricity), these 
criticisms can inhibit homeowners from turning to solar.49 However, in retrospect, 
these dissenting voices may appear to have missed the boat. They will still carp 
about solar's perceived disadvantages long after purchasing behavior has moved 
far up the S-curve. 
For these reasons, offering incentives to adopt a product (such as tax credits50) 
works best when it prompts early adopters to switch to a new product that is not 
directly comparable to the existing one. In the car/PMV scenario, I ascribed no 
difference in performance to cars vis-a-vis PMVs: both furnish "transportation." 
Given the PMV industry's market dominance, it is almost inconceivable that cars 
would dislodge PMVs. However, if a technology can displace the other with 
"disruptive" characteristics-for example, the cell phone is different from the 
landline because it makes and receives calls, but is portable51-then it is more 
likely that some consumers would discover its attractive features. The ability to 
carry a cell phone, for example, makes up for the occasional dropped signals. 
The fundamental inquiry then becomes how to move beyond early adopters to 
widespread diffusion of a disruptive technology. Professor Everett Rogers' 
pioneering work on this subject refers to five factors thl,lt move an innovation 
· toward the higher end of the S-curve: 
• The innovation has to be available through regular organizational 
channels; 
• The adopters have to understand enough about the innovation to make 
a decision; 
Rates? Evidence from U.S. Electric Utilities, UOREGON.EDU (June 5, 2009), 
http:! /pages. uoregon.edu/cameron/WEAl _ AERE _ 2009/paper _ Tra.pdf. 
48 IMPACTS OF A 15-PERCENT RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD, supra note 47. 
49 See Barriers to Renewable Energy Technologies, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean _energy/technology_ and _impacts/energy_ techno 
logies/barriers-to-renewable-energy.html (last updated Oct. 27, 2002) (noting that, 
"renewables will be unable to compete on a level playing field with conventional 
generation until new policies are adopted to internalize the public costs of these fossil fuel 
sources"). 
50 In the automotive context, see, e.g., Chris Woodyard, Congress Moves on Electric-
Car Tax Credits after Obama's Call, USA TODAY, Jan. 26, 2011, available at 
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/driveon/post/2011/0l/move-to-extend-electric-
car-tax-credits-after-obamas-call-/l (members of Congress propose to introduce bills to 
increase numbers of vehicles eligible for tax breaks). 
51 Professor Rogers terms this "relative advantage." FARHAR & COBURN, supra note 
5, at 23. 
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• The adoption decision has to have salience-it has to be important 
enough to be at or near the top of an individual's or a household's action 
list; 
• The adopters need a support system, preferably the organization from 
which the innovation was purchased, and access to friends or others who 
understand the innovation; and 
• The adopters need the financial wherewithal to purchase the 
innovation, or financing arrangements to make purchase possible. 52 
A. "Regular Organizational Channels, " "Salience'.' of a Solar Installation, 
and Financial Considerations 
351 
Looking at the list above, current initiatives to homeowners to install 
residential solar systems have limited appeal. They only address Rogers' fifth 
criterion, and even then, they do so imperfectly. "Regular organizational channels" 
refers to an entire distribution web, not just access to retail outlets. A large body of 
marketing literature analyzes the complex chain of organizations that, say, puts 
products on supermarket shelves. 53 The marketing "channel" can .include some 
functions that are "under the control of the producer and some outside the 
producer's control," but to provide the seamless distribution web, "all must be 
recognized, selected, and integrated into an efficient channel arrangement."54 Even 
at the storefront level (let alone elsewhere), this efficiency is not present in 
residential solar. Researching, vetting, and working with solar installers are the 
equivalent of buying a car from a custom coach builder. You can buy a cell phone 
on every urban comer, but it takes legwork to find solar dealers. Take this test: ask 
any homeowner, anywhere in the United States, to name a reliable solar installer in 
their metropolitan area. Chances are he or she cannot do so. 
Rogers' second criterion is whether prospective buyers understand the 
technology well enough to consider purchasing it. As his work makes clear, "[t]he 
perceived complexity of an innovation is negatively related to its rate of 
adoption."55 Residential solar, unfortunately, is a complex technology,56 and the 
lack of standardized solar systems makes it difficult for prospective owners to 
evaluate it. The requirement to fit the technology to the characteristics of 
individual sites effectively puts the homeowner in the position of serving as a 
technology consultant for each residential solar project. 
The third criterion, "salience," relates to the product's importance to the 
prospective purchaser.57 In the car/PMV situation, of course, transportation is 
52 F ARHAR & COBURN, supra note 5, at 19. 
53 JOHN BURNETI, CORE CONCEPTS OF MARKETING 254 (2008), available at 
http://globaltext.terry.uga.edu/userfiles/pdf/Core%20Concepts%20of>/o20Marketing.pdf. 
54 Id. 
55 F ARHAR & COBURN, supra note 5, at 18. . 
56 Eisen, Solar Utilities, supra note 4, at 73-74. 
57 F ARHAR & COBURN, supra note 5, at 23. 
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indispensable. I set the hypothetical car owner in the suburbs, where few walk any 
distance to reach their destinations. I assumed every household would have either a 
car or a PMV, with no "None of the Above" option. Given present spatial 
distribution patterns, that would be unthinkable. Solar, however, is on the opposite 
end of the salience spectrum. With electricity rates relatively low in most parts of 
the nation,58 and reliability strong, few consumers have switched to solar. Polls 
consistently indicate that Americans want more solar power,59 and more 
governmental resources devoted to its development,60 but they have not reached 
for their wallets just yet. That may change with more recognition of the damaging 
impacts of climate change, but for now, there is little evidence of a widespread 
commitment to this expensive purchase. 
The fourth criterion, availability of a network to support the purchase, is 
virtually absent everywhere. True, some firms have begun to provide extended 
warranties on their systems, but few have long-term track records of service and 
support.61 Professor Rogers includes word of mouth and informal support (for 
example, from neighbors) in a "network." If a large critical mass of one 
neighborhood had solar panels, homeowners could develop a base of knowledge 
about them and share observations with one another. This is not likely to be the 
case with solar, where each installation project is a one-of-a-kind,62 and few areas 
at present see widespread adoption of the technology in neighborhood clusters. 
Even if all these criteria were satisfied, no current financial incentive or set of 
incentives brings the cost of even a modest ~ized solar system below the level 
where consumers are willing to adopt it in large numbers. The National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory (NREL) finds that the willingness to pay (WTP) threshold for 
PV systems is about $5,000 for a 1.2 kw PV system,63 which would provide some 
(but not all) of the electricity for a typical 2,500 square foot house.64 No 
combination of federal, state, local, and utility incentives currently being offered 
on a widespread basis will bring the cost of a typical system below that. 
58 See Electricity, U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/fuelelectric.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
59 For Third Consecutive Year, National Poll Shows More Than 9 Out of 10 
Americans Want Solar Now, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. Ass'N (Oct. 11, 2010), 
http://www.seia.org/cs/news _ detail?pressrelease.id= 1061. 
60 Id. (noting that, "four out of five (80 percent of) Americans feel that Congress 
should reallocate federal subsidies away from fossil fuels towards renewable energy 
industries"); Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Alternative Energy Bill Does Best Among Eight 
Proposals, GALLUP (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/145880/altemative-energy-
bill-best-arnong-eight-proposals.aspx (83% of those polled by Gallup wanted Congress to 
"Pass an energy bill that provides incentives for using solar and other alternative energy 
sources," a higher majority than supported any other major legislative priority). 
61 Eisen, Solar Utilities, supra note 4, at 74. 
62 Musser, supra note 20. 
63 FARHAR& COBURN, supra note 5, at 71. 
64 Id. 
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Two different types of financial incentives attempt to address this problem: 
the feed-in tariff (FIT)65 and the "PACE" (property assessed clean energy) bond.66 
The former pays above-market rates for the electricity generated by the system,67 
while the latter relies on municipal bonds to provide full up-front funding of 
systems in return for repayment through a property owner's tax bill.68 A FIT is a 
bit like offering free gas to a driver. If the person offered the incentive is already a 
good bet to adopt the technology, then the FIT might prompt her to do so, but it 
does not address the initial system cost, transaction costs associated with the 
installation, or any other upfront issues. Financing through a PACE bond requires 
the homeowner to offset the long-term increase in property taxes with savings from 
decreased electricity bills. Leaving aside the current controversy involving Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac that has~ dampened enthusiasm for PACE,69 there are some 
drawbacks to using PACE for residential solar. Homeowners may not view PACE 
funding as providing them with "free" systems when they are required to repay the 
bonds through increases in their tax bills.70 Research has consistently shown that 
consumers adopt much shorter time horizons for energy systems than those of the 
PACE bonds.71 
65 See generally Jim Rossi, Address at the Wallace Stegner Center Future of Energy 
Law Symposium: PURPA and Feed-In Tariffe (Jan. 21, 2011); K.ARLYNN CORY, TOBY 
COUTURE, & CLAIRE KREYCIK, NAT'L RENE.WABLE ENERGY LAB., FEED-IN TARIFF 
POLICY: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND RPS POLICY INTERACTIONS, (2009), available at 
http://www.nrel.gov I docs/fy09osti/ 4 5 549. pdf; John Perkins, Comment, Overcoming 
Jurisdictional Obstacles to Feed-In Tariffe in the United States, 40 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 97 (2009) (discussing current U.S. FITs and proposals for additional ones). 
66 See THE WHITE HOUSE, POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR PACE FINANCING PROGRAMS 
(2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/P ACE _Principles.pdf. 
States that have PACE programs include New Mexico, Texas, New York, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin. Id. at 3. ' 
67 This has led to challenges that FITs and FIT-like policies are inconsistent with 
PURPA's avoided cost mandate. See gener-ally California Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 132 
F.E.R.C. ~61,047 (Docket Nos. ELI0-64-000 and ELI0-66-000 (2010)) and the various 
petitions for rehearing. This issue is discussed in Rossi, supra note 69. 
68 See Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Programs, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, 
http ://www l .eere. energy .gov /wip/so lutioncenter/financialproducts/pace.html (last updated; 
Apr. 27, 2010). 
69 The debate about priority for PACE liens in mortgages guaranteed by Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac has put the future of PACE programs in doubt. Steve Sacks, PACE 
Lawsuit Update (BerkeleyFirst and GreenFinanceSF Still Suspended), CALIFORNIA GREEN 
BLDG. BLOG (Oct. 20, 20 i 0, 1 :07 AM), http://californiagreenbuildingblog.com/2010/10/ 
20/pace-lawsuit-update/. 
70 Eisen, Solar Utilities, supra note 4, at 85. 
71 See Noah M. Sachs, Greening Demand: Energy Consumption and US. Climate 
Polley, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 295, 307-08 (2009). 
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Another potentially promising option is the leasing programs for solar 
systems offered by companies such as SunRun,72 BrightGrid,73 and SolarCity.74 
Leases require little or no upfront investment, and some homeowners will 
recognize that the savings from free electricity generated by the panels offset the 
leasing costs. However, the same problem exists here as with PACE: consumers 
discount future energy savings,75 so they may not find leasing attractive. At the 
small scale of leasing activities to date, the proposition that consumers will find it 
attractive remains largely untested.76 
C. Likelihood of Diffusion: An Empirical Test 
An empirical test was conducted to obtain real world data on Rogers' criteria 
for diffusion as applied to residential solar. Price quotes from solar installers were 
solicited in metropolitan areas located in six different states: California, Florida, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, Tennessee and Virginia. The test states were chosen to 
create variety in a number of different criteria that relate to the potential for 
residential solar to compete with other sources of electricity. 
The first three criteria relate to different retail prices of electricity across the 
nation. States were chosen that were both above (California, New Jersey, and 
Florida) and below (New Mexico, Tennessee, and Virginia) the national average 
price of electricity.77 During the 1990s and 2000s, some states such as California 
and New Jersey implemented "retail choice" (consumers could choose their retail 
electricity suppliers), although most states have curtailed these programs.78 Some 
72 SunRun is the nation's leading provider of solar leases and has financed several 
thousand home solar power systems. See Solar Leasing, SUNRUN, http://www.sunrunhome. 
com/solar-financing/solar-leasing (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
73 See Eric Wesoff, BrightGrid Enters Residential Solar Financing Market, 
GREENTECHMEDIA (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/bright 
grid-enters-residential-solar-financing-market/. 
74 See Steven Overly, California solar company acquires Maryland foothold, WASH. 
POST., Jan. 24, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/ 
AR2011012106209.html (discussing SolarCity's entry into the Maryland market). 
75 Sachs, supra note 71, at 309. 
76 See generally Overly, supra note 74 (noting that SolarCity boasts of "10,000 solar 
projects that have been completed or are underway in Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Oregon and Texas, its current markets," with commercial projects making up half of that 
total). 
77 See State Electricity Profiles, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf 
/electricity/st_profiles/e_profiles_sum.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). The 2008 
nationwide average price of electricity was $0.0974/kWh. The prices in California 
($0.1248/kWh), Florida ($0.1074) and New Jersey ($0.1444/kWh) exceeded this average; 
the prices in New Mexico ($0.0835/k:Wh), Virginia ($0.08/kWh) and Tennessee 
($0.0818/kWh) were below this average. 
78 Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and 
Retrenchme,nt in Electric Utility Deregulation, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545, 546 (2005). 
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states, such as Tennessee, never restructured~ States were chosen that represent 
both deregulated and regulated (or, in the case of Virginia, re-regulated79) utility 
environments. In some states, wholesale electricity prices are set today through 
centralized wholesale markets run by regional transmission organizations (RTOs) 
and Independent System Operators (ISOs).80 In others, wholesale rates are set by 
the traditional public utility regulation process. States were chosen that represent 
both type of wholesale purchasing environment. Utilities in New Jersey, for 
example, are in the PJM RT0;81 utilities in most of Tennessee do not belong to any 
ISO or RT0:82 
Other criteria relate to states' promotion of solar and other forms of renewable 
energy. Studies were consulted to determine those. states having fi;lvorable 
regulatory climates for renewable energy.83 ~Some states (for example, California) 
have multiple forms of policies such as net metering, renewable portfolio 
standards, contractor licensing policies and so forth. 84 Other states, such as 
Tennessee and Virginia, have many fewer policies to encourage renewables. 85 
79 The 2007 Virginia Electric Utility Regulation Act, ch. 888, 2007 Va. Acts 2402 
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-576 to-596) ended the transition to 
competition in Virginia and provided for a system of re-regulation of electric utilities. See 
generally Greene and Hart, supra note 23; VA. STATE CORP. COMM., STATUS REPORT: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VIRGINIA ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION ACT (2010), available 
at http://www.scc.virginia.gov/comm/reports/201 O _ veur.pdf (discussing Virginia's re-
regulation activities after the enactment of the 2007 law). 
80 See, e.g., Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 73 
Fed. Reg. 64100 (Oct. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
81 Who We Are, PJM, http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2011) ("PJM Interconnection is a regional transmis.sion organization (RTO) that 
coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia"); RTOIISO Map, FED'L 
ENERGY REG. COMM'N, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto/rto-map.asp 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2011) (showing New Jersey as part of PJM). 
82 Id. 
83 ELIZABETH BROWN & SARAH BUSCHE, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., STATE OF 
THE STATES 2008: RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF POLICY 40 tbl.31 
(2008), available at http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/pdfs/43021.pdf. · · 
84 Id.; see also Rules, Regulations & Polices for Renewable Energy, DATABASE OF 
STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEW ABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/summary 
tables/rrpre.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). The Interstate Renewable Energy Council''S 
article on the Top 10 state policies of2010, as compiled by DSIRE, includes the California 
net metering bill and New Jersey wind energy mandate (and no policies in Tennessee or 
Virginia), but also mentions that Florida's renewables subsidies expired at the end of2010. 
Top 10 in 'JO: DSIRE's Picks for Notable State Incentive & Rebate Policies, INTERSTATE 
RENEW ABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, http://irecusa.org/2011/01/top-1O-in-10-dsires-picks-for-
notable-state-incentive-rebate-policies (last visited Mar. 9, 2011 ). 
85 Rules, Regulations & Polices for Renewable Energy, supra note 84. An example of 
a policy available on some but not all states is net metering. Summary Maps: Net Metering 
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Another rough measure of the environment for solar installations in a state is 
the total installed capacity (in megawatts) of PV solar to dates6 and the percentage 
of electricity in the state generated from solar. California is a national leader in 
these benchmarks, with other states such as Virginia trailing far behind.s7 States 
were also chosen for their geographic distribution around the nation, and for their 
potential (with the PV resource measured in .montl}ly average insolation figures) 
for solar to generate electricity.ss California and southwestern states such as New 
Mexico have higher values of PV resource potential than northeastern states.s9 
Finally, states were chosen in which national firms such as SunRun currently 
operate (for example, in New Jersey, where SunRun offers residential leases90) and 
in states where they do not operate at present (including Tennessee and Virginia).91 
Metropolitan areas selected were the largest in each state,92 to increase the 
likelihood that one or more solar installers currently operate in the market. Real 
estate records were consulted to determine the average size of the houses currently 
for sale in these metropolitan areas,93 and utility websites were consulted to 
determine typical electric bills for these average sized homes.94 Solar installers 
from which price quotes were requested met certain business criteria relating to 
trustworthiness and reliability, such as a minimum of two years' accreditation with 
the Better Business Bureau and a rating of B or higher.95 Price quotes were 
Policy, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, 
http://www.dsireusa.org/summarymaps/index.cfm?ee=l&RE=l (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) 
(California has adopted a net metering policy and Tennessee has not). 
s
6 See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REGULATORY CoMM'N, OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS 
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE UPDATE, 3 New Generation In-Service Chart (2010), available 
at h~://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/O 1-19-11-energy-infrastructure.pdf. 
7 BROWN & BUSCHE, supra note 83; See VA. DEP'T OF MINES, MINERALS AND 
ENERGY, VIRGINIA 2010 ENERGY PLAN -- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iii, available at 
http://www.dmme.virginia.gov/DENAEnergyPlan/2010-VEP/ExecSummary.pdf. 
88 This data was obtained from U.S. Solar Resource Maps: Photovoltaics, NAT'L 
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/gis/solar.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
89 Id. 
90 SunRun Information Review, SOLAR POWER AUTH., http://solarpowerauthority.com/ 
sunrun (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
91 Home Solar by State, SUNRUN, http://www.sunrunhome.com/solar-by-state (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2011) (listing the states in which SunRun offers residential solar panel 
installations). 
92 See What Is a Metropolitan Area?, BROOKINGS, http://www.brookings.edu/projects 
/blueprint/mymetro.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2011) (defining a metropolitan area and 
demonstrating that each of the areas selected for the project are the largest in each state). 
93 This and other information are detailed in memoranda by two student researchers 
working at the direction of the author: Madelaine Kramer, New Mexico & California: 
Customer Experiment (Nov. 21, 2010) (on file with author); and Garland Carr, Consumer 
Study (Nov. 21, 2010) (on file with author). 
94 Id. 
95 What Are BBB Ratings?, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, http://www.bbb.org/business-
reviews/ratings (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
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requested by researchers seeking information on systems suitable for average sized 
homes.96 To simulate the average homeowner's knowledge base, any additional 
data, such as a house's directional orientation, composition and size of roofs, 
annual average utility bills, and so forth, were to be provided only on request. 
The results are daunting, ·as shown in Table 1.97 No installer in any area 
quoted a system price below $9,900 after applicable state and federal tax credits 
and incentives, and quotes were often far higher than that. 
T bl 1 P . Q a e : rice uotes R ece1ve dF A or verae:e SI PV S oar iystems, N. .d ationw1 e 
Metropolitan Average Home Price Quote Net Price Notes 
Area Size (sa. ft.) {svstem size) After Incentives 
Los Angeles, 2,487 $22,000 (3 kW) $9,900 
CA 
Jacksonville, 1,561 $30,000 (5 kW) Not quoted Calls to 2d 
FL installer were not 
returned 
Newark, NJ 1,901 $60,000 (6 kW) Not quoted 6 kW system 
claimed to reduce 
monthly electric 
bill by $100; 2d 
installer would 
not provide price 
quote98 
Albuquerque, 2,142 $23,633- $14, 180-$28,078 2d installer 
NM $46,74799 provided similar 
quotes 
Memphis, TN 2,136 $8/k.W Not quoted 2d installer 
(-$48,000 at 6 quoted $60,000 
kW size) fora 6 kW 
svstem 
Norfolk/ 1,553 No price Not quoted 
Virginia quote100 
Beach, VA 
96 Determining the proper system size for a residential solar installation is difficult, as 
it depends on a house's electricity demand, hours of sun it receives per day, geographic 
orientation, and other factors. The 6 kW used in several estimates in the survey is 
consistent with the midpoint of the range of a number of estimates widely available on the 
Internet. See, e.g., Basic Steps to Plan Your Residential Solar Energy System, RESIDENTIAL 
SOLAR PANELS, http://www.residentialsolarpanels.org/plan-solar-system (last visited Mar. 
9, 2011). 
97 Kramer, supra note 93; Carr, supra note 93. 
98 Carr, supra note 93 (noting that one installer stated that it "[ d]epends on how much 
production there would be, how much shade, which way the roof faces, how much roof 
space there is, etc."). 
99 Kramer, supra note 93 (quoting three different system sizes). 
10
° Carr, supra note 93 (noting that she was unsuccessful after several attempts in 
reaching the selected installer). 
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Most quotes did not mention the available state and federal tax incentives, 
leaving the hypothetical homeowners to research them on their own. Nor did 
installers mention that leases might be available. Price quotes often included 
qualifiers such as "a hard bid cannot be determined until the customer provides a 
full year of utility bills, and someone looks at the roof and determines if the 
electrical service needs any upgniding."101 Installers typically also requested a 
year's worth of electric bills. 102 
Looking at these findings, it is no wonder that one recent NREL report 
concludes that the transaction costs of retrofitting existing houses with solar are 
prohibitive at present. 103 Most homeowners would not proceed further with the 
installation process after receiving these quotes, which would make solar systems 
more expensive in many cases than the average new automobile. 104 When they find 
out about the legal and practical hurdles to installation, the number of interested 
homeowners would dwindle still further. 
D. Would Installations in New Homes Fare Differently? 
Until now, I assumed that solar systems would be installed as retrofits in 
existing American homes. In new homes, some transaction costs associated with 
retrofitting existing houses might be bypassed. If homebuilders were willing to 
bundle solar systems as a feature of their new houses, we might see rapid uptake of 
solar. 105 
A recent NREL stildy illustrates the complexities involved in this. The study 
examined solar hot water heater and PV panel uptake in a subdivision of 306 
homes in the early 2000s in San Diego, where two builders offered both types of 
system in new homes. 106 In some cases, buyers were offered PV systems as 
optional add-ons, on lists with features such as granite countertops in kitchens or 
larger garages. In other cases, the PV systems were sold as standard features. 107 In 
all, 96 homes were sold with 1.2-kW PV systems standard, with eight buyers 
101 Kramer, supra note 93. 
102 /d. 
103 FARHAR &COBURN, supra note 5, at xviii (noting that, "[t]ransaction costs are too 
high when homes and solar energy systems are sold separately"). 
104 Facts for Consumers, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/ 
consume/autos/autl l.shtm (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (quoting the average cost of a new 
car at $28,400). 
105 See, e.g., GEORGE SIMONS, CAL. ENERGY COMM., DEVELOPING COST-EFFECTIVE 
SOLAR RESOURCES WITH ELECTRICITY SYSTEM BENEFITS 26 (2005), available at 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-500-2005-104/CEC-500-2005-104.PDF 
(observing that if each new home slated to be built in California by the year 2017 "had a 2 
kW solar installation, then the total potential residential solar generation would be ... 
4,886 MW"). 
106 FARHAR & COBURN, supra note 5, at l. 
107 Id. at 4. 
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upgrading their systems to 2.4-kW for an additional $4,000. 108 For the 164 buyers 
with the option of purchasing either a 1.2-kW system for $6,000 or a 2.4-kW 
system for $10,000, sixteen purchased 1.2-kW systems and another eight 
purchased 2.4-kW systems. 109 
Two important conclusions may be drawn from this evidence. Because the 
vast majority (80 percent) of PV systems sold came standard, researchers 
concluded that "the uptake on optional PV equipment was not as strong as it might 
have been" and that "offering PV systems as an optional feature is not an optimal 
marketing strategy."110 As a realtor commented, "Solar is a big 'Wow!' when Iain. 
selling [preplotted] homes. But it is harder to add the $6,000 for the optional 
systems."111 The reasons for this included concerns about long payback periods, 
maintenance, and reliability. 112 Indeed, the· most important factor in whether a 
home was sold with a PV system was eliminating consumer choice. 113 NREL 
researchers cited studies showing that "homebuyers found it easier to purchase PV 
systems when they did not have to make separate decisions about it."114 
Transaction costs were still considerable when PV systems were included in 
new homes. 115 The builder's marketing of the technology can be a positive factor 
in its adoption. 116 Yet the homebuilder reported that it was "painful" to train 
salespeople to sell PV systems, as they experienced an "enormous" learning 
curve. 117 Also, "offering optional PV systems seems to be burdensome for large-
IOS fd. at 44. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 43. 
112 Id. at 316 (noting "If PV systems are offered optionally, the most important 
barriers to the purchase of optional PV systems are that potential buyers perceive the 
systems as too expensive and that payback would be too long. Main homebuyers who 
chose not to purchase homes with PV systems also indicate concerns about maintenance 
and system reliability."). 
113 Susan Kraemer, Solar Homes Sold 20% Faster, and for 17% More, NREL Study 
Finds, CLEANTECHNICA.COM, http://cleantechnica.com/2010/10/23/solar-homes-sold-20-
faster-and-for-17-more-nrel-study-finds/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2011) (noting that, "building 
the house with the solar system as standard was found to be behind the successful 
widespread adoption of the solar powered homes."). 
114 FARHARAND COBURN, supra note 5, at 47. 
115 Id. at 329. 
116 Id. 
117 F ARHAR AND COBURN, supra note 5, at 51: 
SheaHomes had no staff experienced in ZEHs except Ryan Green. The 
learning curve associated with producing the ZEHs was characterized as 
"enormous," including all the new language, acronyms, companies, products, 
and governmental agencies. The company had no previous experience that 
would help it. to anticipate and avoid problems. SheaHomes found climbing this 
curve to be a painful experience. 
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production builders because the transaction costs of scheduling system installation 
are higher than if the installations were routine for each house."118 There were also 
considerable problems involving interconnection with the local utility, which by 
itself can dissuade homeowners from installing solar. 119 
Looking at this evidence, it appears as difficult to retool the real estate sales 
infrastructure to promote solar as it is to ask PMV dealerships to sell cars. Not 
surprisingly, the study concludes that the most promising means of promoting PV 
systems is to offer them as standard features in future construction. However, the. 
study suggests some reasons for caution. The sales took place between 2001 and 
2003, when the California housing market was a sellers' paradise: 120 
The demand for housing in San Diego was high in 2001 and there 
was a waiting list and a lottery system for the first purchases of 
SheaHomes at Scripps Highlands. After a construction trailer was placed 
at the site, the SheaHomes office immediately began to receive numerous 
calls about the development. All of the initial homes built were sold 
without prospective buyers having the benefit of model homes. Only the 
land itself, floor plans, and sketches of house elevations were available 
for potential buyers to see. This represents a "sellers" market for both 
SheaHomes and the comparison builder. 121 
Needless to say, things have changed considerably since then, with the free-fall in 
housing prices since 2007, widespread foreclosures, and a drop in Californians' 
home equity of more than $1. 7 trillion. 122 In the inflated market of the early 2000s, 
homebuilders could include PV systems as standard features and still offer homes 
118 Id. at 330. 
119 Id. at 52: 
The utility was sending to the homebuyers for their signatures highly 
complex legal documents dealing with interconnection to the utility grid 
appropriate for corporations. Neither SheaHomes staff nor homebuyers had any 
prior experience in dealing with interconnectivity agreements. New homebuyers 
did not understand these SDG&E interconnectivity agreements and turned to the 
SheaHomes staff for help. The staff, therefore, spent a good deal of time 
interfacing with SDG&E and homebuyers on interconnectivity issues. 
120 See, e.g., Hugo Martin and Seema Mehta, Strong Local Economy Will Ease 
Cutbacks, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 2003, at Metro.p.1 (discussing the thriving housing market 
in Southern California in 2003 despite economic difficulties). 
121 F ARHAR AND COBURN, supra note 5, at 42. 
122 Alejandro Lazo, When Will Housing Come Back in California? Five Experts Offer 
Their Views, L.A. TIMES, (Jan. 1, 2011), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/ 
01/business/la-fi-cover-housing-recovery-20110102. 
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at competitive prices. 123 Today, it might be more difficult to do so, and even more 
difficult to offer a PV system as an optional feature. Numerous studies show that 
homeowners are interested in PV systems and other energy-related features in new 
homes. 124 On the other hand, their interest does not necessarily translate into hard 
commitments to purchase these systems. This interest might be a lukewarm pro-
environmentalism that can fade with a hefty price tag of $7,500-$14,000 or more, 
especially in a struggling housing market, less overheated than that of California in 
the early 2000s. 
Bundling PV systems in new houses also takes builders with the commitment 
to offer energy-saving features in their new construction, which can be problematic 
unless builders perceive that it helps their marketing efforts. The national builder 
Toll Brothers, for example, recently announced a program with SunRun to sell 
luxury golf course homes in Southern California with PV systems installed, with 
the buyers leasing the panels. 125 If this were more the norm than the exception, it 
might become common to see PV systems in new houses. At present, however, 
these efforts are more like pilot projects. 
III. FOUR MODELS FOR PROMOTING MORE RESIDENTIAL SOLAR INSTALLATIONS 
As one observer puts it st~rkly, "Residential solar remains a difficult sell."126 
There are pockets of encouraging activity where leasing programs and utility 
incentives have spurred growth, but the total volume of installations is still 
discouragingly small. With the pressure of climate change prompting action on all 
fronts relating to reducing carbon emissions from electricity generation as soon as 
possible, 127 we don't have decades available to wait for the situation to improve. 
How, then, can we encourage more uptake of residential PV systems? 
123 F ARHAR AND COBURN, supra note 5, at 40. 
124 See, e.g., Heather Knight, Solar Power Rebates Big Hit, S.F. CHRONICLE, July 8, 
2009, at Dl. 
125 Toll Brothers Introduces Solar Energy Program at Its New Luxury Golf Course 
Community in Southern California, SUNRUN, July 6, 2010, http://\vww.sunrunhome.com/ 
about-sunrun/sunrun-in-the-news/press-releases/toll-brothers-introduces-solar-energy-
program. 
126 Wesoff, supra note 73. 
127 The Full Global Warming Solution:· How the World Can Stabilize at 350 to 450 
ppm, CLIMATEPROGRESS.ORG, (Jan. 10, 2011) http://climatepi;ogress.org/2011/01/10/the-
full-global-warming-so lution-how-the-world-can-stabilize-at-3 50-to-450-ppm/ (calling for 
"twice as many [stabilization] wedges," including 2000 gigawatts of solar PV, to address 
climate change). See generally S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the 
Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968 
(2004) (Developing "stabilization wedge" concept). 
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A. The "Pure Entrepreneurial" Model 
If strong latent residential demand for solar exists, presumably firms will 
spring up to satisfy it and grow to larger scale as they work out the various legal, 
technical, and financial issues. A variant on this "pure entrepreneurial" model 
might be a state incentive program that offers funding for installations (like Florida 
and Virginia did with ARRA funding) and drives consumers to existing 
companies. This idea has great superficial appeal. If there is energy gold to be had 
on residential roofs, then companies would rush to get at it. Those with the vision 
to do so would capture the economies of scale of multiple installations. 
Empowering competition in this industry is also consistent with the "Small Is 
Beautiful" ethos prevalent in the solar and wind industries since their inception. 128 
Looking to other industries built on different forms of new technology, this 
entrepreneurial model assumes a visionary will emerge who can take the core 
technology and recognize the value added in it. Think Bill Gates making 
something out of an "operating system."129 The radio industry transforming to a 
network of broadcasting conglomerates.130 "The Social Network."131 With solar, 
we figure someone, somewhere will figure out how to scale it up to amazing 
heights. This is the promise of every new breakthrough technology: firms will 
grow more rapidly than their history can be written. Venture capital firms are 
making large bets on some renewable energy companies today. 132 
Yet it has been a long time since anyone created a major energy industry 
virtually from scratch in this country. And waiting for residential solar to scale up 
in a free-market fashion also ignores the extensive subsidization of the current 
"PMV" (utility) system and downplays or ignores the realities of innovation 
diffusion. In effect, we assume the "custom coach builder" problem is either 
irrelevant or will be overcome once enough people purchase or lease solar systems. 
For an illustration of how futile that course of action might be, think back to the 
car/PMV scenario. Suppose there was an enterprising company willing to change 
the prevailing business model with standardization. Imagine a company called 
128 See, e.g., Rob Day, Small Is Beautiful, CLEANTECH INVESTING (Apr. 15, 2010, 
8:30 am), http://www.greentechrnedia.com/cleantech-investing/post/srnall-is-beautiful; 
Kelly Hart, Small Is Beautiful, GREENHOMEBUILDING.COM, http://www.greenhomebuild 
ing.com/articles/small.htrn (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
129 See JAMES w ALLACE AND JIM ERICKSON, HARD DRIVE: BILL GA TES AND THE 
MAKING OF THE MiCROSOFT EMPIRE (1993). 
130 JOSEPH STRAUBHAAR, ROBERT LAROSE, & LUCINDA DAVENPORT, MEDIA Now: 
UNDERSTANDING MEDIA, CULTURE, AND TECHNOLOGY 159-64 (2008) (describing the rise 
of the American radio industry). 
131 THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Columbia Pictures 2010). 
132 See, e.g., CleanTech Advisory Council, NAT'L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS'N, 
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com _ content&view=article&id=90&Iternid=236 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
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"Car Makers" comes to your house, promising it can make a car for you in one of 
three basic configurations, if you are willing to sign a lease for five years. You've 
never heard of Car Makers, but they do have a spiffy website with testimonials 
from recent buyers, and they tout the financial advantages of leasing. 
Would this prompt much movement from the status quo? Probably not, as it 
faces the extensive headwinds of the "PMV" situation. In the solar context, leave 
aside for the moment any reticence a consumer might have about doing business 
with a company she is unfamiliar with, and which has no track record in the 
business model it is promoting. The existing electric utility industry provides what 
many consumers regard as the exact same product, with no new financing 
arrangement required. Utilities offer their product at low regulated rates and on 
demand, and so there is little about the existing system that would prompt anyone 
besides early adopters to switch. 
B. "Exchange" or "Neighborhood" Purchasing 
Assume a different solution to this problem: the power of group purchasing, 
akin to what retailers like Costco do (or, in a different public policy arena, the 
medical care purchasing exchange). In the car/PMV scenario, suppose one of your 
neighbors takes on the responsibility of buying ten cars for the neighborhood, 
negotiating a price up front with the custom builder. Because the buyer is. 
committing to purchase more cars, presumably she will obtain a better price for 
each, and will spare each person the hassles associated with customizing her car. In 
the renewable energy setting, the organization One Block Off The Grid (1BOG) 133 
offers volume pricing and selects installers for individual homeowners who sign up 
with lBOG to form neighborhood groups. 
This model assumes transaction costs pose the most significant hurdles to 
individual homeowners seeking to install residential solar. Given the arduous 
process of the typical installation, 134 that is not an unrealistic assumption. 
However, the group purchasing model substitutes another form of transaction costs 
for those faced by the individual. Someone has to make the decisions about what . 
goes into each solar system (lBOG does this by individualized assessments of 
each house that signs up for the program). Unless the group purchaser has been 
granted full authority to do this, there promises to be a give-and-take discussion 
between each buyer and the group purchaser, so this model simply shifts legwork 
to the group organizer. This requires an incentive for the organizer, which in the 
case of lBOG takes the form of referral fees from solar installers. 135 It does not 
133 ONE BLOCK OFF THE GRID, http://lbog.org/ {last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
134 See Danielle Douglas, Government Incentives Give Solar Energy a Boost, WASH. 
POST, July 19, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article 
/2010/07/16/AR2010071605451.html (stating that the average cost of residential solar 
panel installation ranges from $20,000 and $40,000 and demonstrating that a family could 
find only one "full-service" installer). 
135 Frequently Asked Questions, ONE BLOCK OFF THE GRID, http://about.lbog.org/ 
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appear that lBOG handles the legal issues associated with homeowner associations 
or local permitting, so that burden remains with the homeowner. Also, the 
assumption that volume pricing can bring prices below the threshold of 
homeowners' willingness to pay for solar may not be realistic. 
C. Waiting for the "Angel Investor" 
In 2010, Google announced a major new initiative it called the "Google 
Power Line," an offshore transmission line backbone to connect with current and 
planned wind energy projects along the Atlantic coast. 136 The scale of this initiative 
is simply breathtaking, and it could revolutionize the process of connecting 
offshore wind projects with the onshore electricity grid. 137 
In a similar fashion, wouldn't some firm find it irresistible to enter into the 
residential solar market and scale up installations dramatically? Considering that 
Google is willing to get into the extremely complex transmission business, it might 
be possible for a large venturer to enter this space as well. The obvious problem is · 
that it requires an angel investor unconcerned with the current diseconomies of 
scale. Consider what that firm would be required to do. First, get financing (lots of 
it) from someone (A venture capital firm? Its own operations? A government 
agency?) convinced that residential solar can overcome the ubiquity of 
traditionally generated electricity. At an approximate cost of $10,000 per 
installation, it would take many millions of dollars in financial power to make a 
difference. The firm would also have to be willing to address the legal and 
logistical hurdles associated with solar installations. 138 As no firm has yet done 
this, it seems unlikely that one ever will, under current market conditions. 
D. A New Idea: The "Solar Utility" 
Letting current entrants into the residential solar business go it alone also 
ignores a critical feature of growth in technology: the governmental support (in the 
form of funding and key regulatory decisions) necessary for dramatic 
transformation in an industry where barriers exist to rapid growth. One early 
example is the radio industry, where key government decisions about technology 
and licenses led to the formation of major broadcasting companies. 139 
faq/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
136 See Joel B. Eisen, presentation at William and Mary Environmental Law & Policy 
Review Symposium: On Looking Beyond the Deepwater Horizon: The Future of Offshore 
Drilling (Jan. 29, 2011) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Eisen, Don't Drill, 
Windmill!]; Tom Doggett, U.S. Offshore Agency Excited Over Google Power Line, 
REUTERS (Oct. 14, 20 l 0), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE69D6502 0101014. 
137 Eisen, Don't Drill, Windmill!, supra note 136. 
138 See, e.g., Musser, supra note 20. 
139 STRAUBHAAR, LAROSE, & DAVENPORT, supra note 130. 
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The cell phone industry is an excellent example of governmental support for a 
technology that disrupted an existing market. In the 1970s, no one had cell phones. 
When cell phone technology arrived on the scene, a "phone" was a landline 
telephone. Even as late as the mid-1980s, Hollywood portrayed a dashing reporter 
working on a deadline over a public pay phone. 14° Could the transformation we 
have witnessed since then have been accomplished by a smattering of cell phone 
companies nationwide putting up a few tens of millions of dollars each to convince 
people to buy portable phones? Of course not. A cell phone requires an extensive 
infrastructure to work. There must be towers to repeat the cell signals, and until a 
cell signal could be reliably obtained in a wide geographic area, a widespread 
market for cell phones was impossible. In the 1970s, before basic decisions were 
made to build that network by ~a government that handed out key licenses to market 
participants, the landline phone industry was so entrenched that its competitive 
position looked forever insurmountable. 141 
The extensive subsidies granted to fossil fuel industries put it in essentially 
the same position as the landline telephone industry in the 1970s, 142 and it may 
take the same sort of commitment to support the solar industry as was made to cell 
phone pioneers. This makes the situation fundamentally different from the 
transformation currently taking place in the software industry, where iPhone 
owners download apps and thereby displace traditional development and 
distribution channels for computer software. A more apt parallel might be the cable 
or phone companies, which have their distribution structures hardwired (literally) 
into millions of American homes. 143 We would not seriously countenance building 
a second set of phone or cable lines to reach those homes to allow for competition 
by providers who thought they could do a better job with that infrastructure. 
Let's then perform a bit of economic jiu jitsu with the existing "PMV" 
(utility) distribution infrastructure, much as we have done with the cable and phone 
lines. Why not force utilities to sell solar panels? There would be inevitable howls 
about ending the capitalist system as we know it by telling firms what they can and 
cannot sell. As we have learned with electric utility restructuring, 144 it might take 
an enormous financial incentive to assuage complaints that utilities were being 
deprived of their legitimate opportunity to earn a profit. But perhaps the best 
objection is that this asks the system to retool for a different purpose that it would 
not accommodate easily. 
140 BROADCAST NEWS (20th Century Fox 19$7). 
141 Milton Mueller, Universal Service and the New Telecommunications Act: 
· Mythology Made Law, 40 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 39, no. 3, 39 (1997). 
142 Mueller, supra note 141. 
143 ECPA Reform & the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the c;onstitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, of the 
H. Judiciary Comm. 11 lth Cong., 111-1091 at 13 (2010) (stating, "the traditional wire line 
telephones that we grew up with ... use[] ... cable connected to your home or office."). 
144 Eisen, Solar Utilities, supra note 4, at n.205 (noting the treatment of "stranded 
costs" in electric utility restructuring). 
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This is not like asking a cable line to carry a different quantum of information. 
There would be many impediments; for example, custom assembly of solar panels 
would require a new installation and distribution system for each utility. At the 
retail level, a sales channel that for years had promoted traditional fossil-fueled 
generation and its advantages would be required to change. This would be a major 
barrier to selling solar panels alongside, or in place of utilities' current product. Of 
course, there are other obvious problems with asking a firm to cross-sell an 
unfamiliar product in lieu of devoting its efforts to the currently profitable product. 
Given utilities' historical lack of involvement in these endeavors, it makes 
much more sense to speak in favor of establishing a completely separate 
distribution channel for solar panels. Yet attempting to build a solar company from 
scratch and . operate on a regional or even national scale in competition with 
incumbent utilities would be tough. It would take an extraordinarily committed 
entrant into the market with the technical skills to perform installations, the 
regulatory know-how to evaluate the existing utility landscape in every state, and 
the financial wherewithal to convince funders to support the company. Not to 
mention the small matter of accumulating goodwill comparable to that which 
utilities have built up over many decades. This combination of attributes is as 
difficult to imagine as it would be to imagine a new national car company 
succeeding today. 
Instead, I propose a different business model centered on the concept of a 
"solar utility": 145 a company devoted to national (or at least regional), large-scale 
entry into residential solar market, which would be responsible for the entire 
process of solar marketing and distribution in a wide geographic area. As with the 
cable and phone companies, it is necessary for the federal government to promote 
companies that would offer homeowners solar panel systems at little or no cost. As 
counterintuitive as it may seem to create regulated utilities in a field that already 
has them, the barriers to entry in residential solar make for the type of anti-
competitive environment that has historically prompted governmental intervention 
to entice prospective venturers to move forward. There are numerous ways that 
this system could be structured, and research into many legal and financial issues is 
underway. As one example of a financial model, a solar utility could provide PV 
panels to a homeowner at no cost and recoup its investment through a combination 
of charging for electricity (as in the PPA context), tax incentives, and sale of 
RECs. . 
It is also possible that the "solar utility" could be a completely different entity 
altogether: a "smart grid"146 company that views the solar panel installation as part 
of a portfolio of products and services. Want a plug-in hybrid147 station connected 
145 Eisen, Solar Utilities, supra note 4, at 15. 
146 See generally U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, THE SMART GRID: AN INTRODUCTION 
(2009), http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/DOE _ SG _Book_ Single _Pages(l ). 
pdf. 
147 See generally Alternative Fuels & Advanced Vehicles: Plug-in Hybrid Electric 
Vehicle Basics, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/vehicles/electric 
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to your solar panel? Or, perhaps, home energy management software and hardware 
to lessen your electric bill still further than is possible through the installation of 
solar panels? To imagine utilities doing this would require a historic transition 
from their traditional role as infrastructure providers to a consumer orientation that 
the industry is not prepared for, nor has it shown any inclination to undertake. In 
the efforts to develop a smart grid, it is widely acknowledged that incumbent 
utilities are slow to recognize the potential of new technologies and applications. 148 
As one recent article puts it, "They can acknowledge they are not consumer 
organizations. They can focus on their historic mission of managing the electricity 
infrastructure and getting power to the meter. Let the customer choose a non-utility 
company to manage smart grid applications."149 Relying on utiliti~s to change on 
their own is akin to waiting for the PMV industry to transform itself. That is 
unlikely to happen, and it is better to pursue an alternative course of action. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The car/PMV scenario outlined in this Article is a thought experiment, of 
course, but one designed to illustrate the difficulties of promoting residential solar 
with the system of incentives currently designed for that purpose. If we depart 
from thinking about offering subsidies to level the playing field, and instead focus 
on developing institutions that bypass the existing distribution channel, we may 
make more significant progress than we have in the past four decades. All 9f this is 
possible when we begin to think of business models that depart from offering 
subsidies to compete with the status quo. An incumbent utility could "morph into a 
complete smart grid service provider, supplying digital meters and home energy 
displays, leasing solar panels, and owning electric vehicle charging stations."150 
But it is more likely that distributed solar will have to be offered by new entrants, 
given the historical focus in the electric utility industry on providing power to 
safely meet demand. Supplying consumers with an array of products and services 
is a task that utilities seem concerned about being able to tackle, not one with 
_basics~hev.html (last updated Feb. 22, 2011) (defining and discussing a plug-in hybrid). 
14 See Matthew Lynley, Why Won't Utility Companies Innovate? Smart Grid Leaders 
Explain, GREENBEAT (Nov. 4, 2010), http://venturebeat.com/2010/11/04/why-wont-utility-
companies-innovate-smart-grid-leaders-explain/. For a comparable perspective on 
European utilities, see Andrea Petrou, Utility Companies Failing to Harness Smart Grid 
Potential, TECHEYE (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.techeye.net/business/utility-companies-
failing-to-harness-smart-grid-potential (noting that utilities in Europe are "will not be able 
to reap the full benefits of the technology because they are not considering the key 
capabilities it delivers"). 
149 Peter Behr, Who Will Become the Masters of the 'Smart Grid'?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
23, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/09/23/23climatewire-who-
will-become-the-masters-of-the-smart-grid-4691.html. 
150 Behr, supra note 149. 
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which they have expertise. 151 The challenge is developing the alternative 
infrastructure for delivering residential solar and supporting it, which, given the 
pervasive subsidization of the status quo, will take active governmental 
involvement. 
151 Lynley, supra note 148 (noting that, "[u]tilities are concerned about being 
supplanted by smart grid companies, but aren't sure what to do about it."). See also Gabriel 
Ma, Edison Electric Institute Annual Meeting Notes, HALCROW POWER BLOG (June 30, 
2010), http://blogs.halcrow.com/power/?p=3 (noting that for a utility industry panel on 
"meeting the customer in the home," "the issue of partnering with folks like Google or 
Microsoft raised the specter of the utility being disintermediated by others."). 
